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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of David A. Collins, Respondent. 
Appellate Case Nos. 2016-001503 & 2016-1504 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver pursuant to 
Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Respondent consents to the relief requested in 
the petition. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is 
hereby appointed to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust 
account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
accounts respondent may maintain.  Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by 
Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  
Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre Thomas 
Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly appointed by this Court.
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
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shall serve as notice that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly 
appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
 
Within fifteen days of the date of this order, respondent shall serve and file the 
affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE.  Should respondent fail to timely file the 
required affidavit, he may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this Court as 
provided by Rule 30, RLDE. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
July 20, 2016 
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 THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Wilfred Allen Woods, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Etta Catherine Woods, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-213719 
Appeal From Barnwell County 
W. Thomas Sprott, Jr., Family Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5430 

Heard May 12, 2015 – Filed July 27, 2016 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART  
Jon Terry Clabaugh, Jr., of Columbia, for Appellant. 
Michael P. O'Connell, of Stirling & O'Connell, of Mount 
Pleasant, for Respondent. 
MCDONALD, J.:  In this appeal from family court, Appellant Etta Woods (Wife), 
argues the family court erred in (1) denying her motion to dismiss because the 
court lacked jurisdiction based on the parties' prior agreement; (2) reducing 
alimony from $8,000 to $4,000; (3) providing for an automatic decrease in alimony 
two years in the future; (4) granting Respondent Wilfred Woods's (Husband) 
motion to reconsider; and (5) failing to require Husband to pay any portion of her 
attorney's fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Husband and Wife were married on August 4, 1973, and separated on or about 
October 25, 1997. By order filed in Barnwell County on June 2, 1999 (Divorce 
Decree), the couple divorced on the ground of one year's continuous separation.  
The parties' only child was already emancipated when the parties divorced.
The Divorce Decree approved and incorporated a property settlement agreement 
(Agreement) by which the parties resolved all issues arising from their marriage, 
including Husband's obligation to pay Wife permanent, periodic alimony of $8,000 
per month.  Section I of the Agreement is titled "SPOUSAL SUPPORT" (Spousal 
Support Section). Paragraphs B and E of the Spousal Support Section, in relevant 
part, state as follows: 
[Husband] shall pay directly to [Wife] the sum of 
[$8,000] per month, as and for permanent, periodic 
alimony, commencing June 1, 1999, and payable on the 
first of each month thereafter.  The alimony payments 
provided for in this [A]greement shall be taxable to 
[Wife] for federal and state income tax purposes and 
deductible to [Husband].  These alimony payments shall 
terminate on the remarriage or death of [Wife] or upon 
the death of [Husband] . . . . 
. . . . 
The parties agree that this permanent, periodic alimony 
shall not be modifiable by [Husband] for a period of 
[three] years from the date of the approval of this 
Agreement so long as [Husband's] total gross income (as 
defined by the Internal Revenue Code, including but not 
limited to tax exempt income) is not less than [$500,000]
per year. In the event that [Husband] conveys any of his 
interest in Gilliam & Associates, Inc., in any form, 
including but not limited to an acquisition, merger, 
recapitalization, restructure, or other transference or 
disposal in any fashion whatsoever which provides a 
benefit to [Husband] and which reduces his income to 
below [$500,000] per year, [Husband] acknowledges that 
17 

  
 
 
 
this conveyance shall be subject to review by the Family 
Court for the Second Judicial Circuit for the purposes of 
a reduction of alimony. 
Section XVIII of the Agreement is titled "APPROVAL, NON-MODIFICATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENT" (Approval, Non-modification and 
Enforcement Section). Section XVIII, paragraph D, provides, in relevant part: 
It is the intent of the parties that the provisions of this 
Agreement shall govern all rights and obligations of the 
parties as well as all rights of modification; and, further, 
that the terms and conditions of this Agreement and any 
Order approving the same shall not be modifiable by the 
parties or any court without the written consent of the 
Husband and Wife. The parties specifically agree, except 
as set forth herein, that neither the Family Courts of the 
State of South Carolina nor any other court shall have 
jurisdiction to modify, supplement, terminate, or amend 
this Agreement or the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties hereunder, except as to child support, custody and 
visitation, which the parties understand to be modifiable 
as a matter of law. 
On December 2, 2010, Husband brought this action seeking a modification of his 
alimony obligation due to a changed circumstance—namely, an alleged substantial 
decrease in his income since the issuance of the Divorce Decree.  Wife contended 
the family court lacked jurisdiction to modify alimony based on the terms of the 
parties' Agreement, arguing:  (1) "the changed circumstance alleged by Husband 
was voluntary and intentionally created by him and did not constitute a valid 
changed circumstance justifying an alimony reduction," (2) "the court should 
consider Husband's earning capacity and assets for the purposes of any alimony 
modification," and (3) Wife should receive an "increase in alimony based on a 
change in circumstances, namely an alleged substantial increase in Husband's 
income or earning capacity and assets since the [Divorce Decree]."
On April 12, 2011, Wife moved to dismiss, asserting that the family court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to modify alimony based on the parties' agreement.  The 
18 

  
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
Honorable Dale Moore Gable heard the motion on June 13, 2011, and denied the 
motion from the bench.1  However, Judge Gable's August 26, 2011 order expressly 
left review of the alimony modification issue to the judge presiding at the final 
hearing: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED 
THAT [Wife's] Motion to Dismiss is denied; However 
IT IS FURTHER ORDER [sic] AND DECREED THAT 
that [sic] the Judge at the Final Hearing is not bound by 
this denial and after listening to testimony from the 
parties and witnesses may find that [Husband's] alimony 
obligation to [Wife] is, or is not, modifiable based upon a 
substantial change in circumstances. 
Additionally, Judge Gable quoted section 1 of the Agreement, "SPOUSAL 
SUPPORT," and paragraph XVIII(D), finding both to be "unambiguous and clear."  
Trial was initially scheduled to begin on September 12, 2011, but was continued by 
order dated November 21, 2011.  In this order, the family court provided that if the 
court "determines that a modification of the Defendant's[2] [sic] support obligations 
as set forth in the divorce decree is warranted, the [family court] shall have the 
discretion to make any adjustments retroactive to the date this trial was originally 
scheduled to commence (i.e. September 12, 2011)."   
In February 2012, Husband amended his complaint based on alleged additional 
changed circumstances, including (1) a reduction in his income substantially below 
$500,000 per year, (2) the conveyance of his interest in the business Gilliam & 
Associates, Inc. (Gilliam & Associates), and (3) a decrease in Wife's expenses and 
her anticipated receipt of social security benefits.  Husband also requested that any 
alimony reduction or termination be made "retroactive to the date of filing and at 
1 Although the parties' briefs and paragraph two of Judge Gable's order state that 
the hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on July 13, 2011, the transcript of 
the hearing and the caption of Judge Gable's order set forth that the hearing was 
held on June 13, 2011. 
2 The context of the order makes clear that the family court intended to reference 
Plaintiff's (Husband's) support obligations.
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least retroactive to the date of the previously scheduled [f]inal [h]earing in 
September, 2011. . . ."  Wife amended her responsive pleading, again asserting the 
family court lacked jurisdiction to modify alimony based on the parties'
Agreement.  Wife argued the sale of Husband's interest in the business was 
"contemplated or anticipated" at the time of the divorce and as such did not 
constitute a changed circumstance justifying an alimony modification. 
On August 7, 2012, the Honorable W. Thomas Sprott, Jr., heard pretrial motions, 
including Wife's motion to dismiss.  That same day, Judge Sprott notified both 
parties that he would be denying Wife's motion to dismiss.  Trial was held on 
August 8–10, 2012. By order filed November 30, 2012 (Final Order), Judge Sprott
(1) denied Wife's motion to dismiss; (2) reduced Husband's permanent, periodic 
alimony obligation from $8,000 to $4,000 per month commencing November 1, 
2012; (3) stated the alimony would be taxable to Wife and deductible by Husband 
for income tax purposes; (4) provided that alimony would  be further reduced by 
the amount of social security benefits to which Wife would be entitled when she 
reaches age sixty-two even if she defers taking benefits at that time; and (5) 
required both parties to pay their own attorney fees and costs.3 
On December 12, 2012, Husband served Wife via facsimile with a motion to 
reconsider, stating he had received written notice of the entry of the Final Order on 
December 3, 2012, and sought an order reducing alimony from $8,000 to $4,000 
per month retroactively to September 2011 (when the case was initially scheduled 
to be tried).4  On December 28, 2012, Wife served her notice of appeal challenging 
the Final Order and Interim Orders. 
On January 14, 2013, the family court granted Husband's motion to reconsider.  
Husband had continuously paid Wife $8,000 monthly alimony from June 1999 
through October 2012. In order to give effect to the retroactive reduction in 
3 The family court issued two interim orders, both of which were filed on 
November 30, 2012 (Interim Orders).  These Interim Orders reduced Husband's 
alimony payment to $4,000 per month for the months of November 2012 and 
December 2012 pending issuance of the Final Order.   
4 Husband's motion to reconsider was served upon Wife by mail on December 19, 
2012. 
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alimony to September 12, 2011, the family court ordered Husband to start paying 
Wife reduced alimony of $2,000 monthly beginning on November 1, 2012, until 
Husband was fully reimbursed for the overpayments.  
On January 23, 2013, Wife served a motion to reconsider the order granting 
Husband's motion to reconsider.  On February 25, 2013, the family court allowed 
Wife to file a return to Husband's motion to reconsider and stayed the January 
2013 order granting Husband's motion to reconsider.  Wife filed a return to 
Husband's motion to reconsider on March 8, 2013.  The parties filed a stipulation 
on September 26, 2013, regarding the fax transmission of Husband's motion to 
reconsider. 
On September 4, 2013, this court remanded the case to the family court for the 
limited purpose of ruling on any pending motions that might affect the appeal, 
including the motions to reconsider.  On October 28, 2013, the family court issued 
a second order, granting Husband's motion to reconsider and vacating the January 
2013 order. 
On November 27, 2013, Wife served a notice of appeal challenging the October 
2013 order granting Husband's motion to reconsider.  On January 27, 2014, this 
appeal was consolidated with Wife's prior appeal of the Final Order and Interim 
Orders.5 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I.		 Did the family court err in denying Wife's motion to dismiss because it 
lacked jurisdiction to modify alimony under the terms of the parties'
agreements? 
II.		 Did the family court err in reducing alimony or, alternatively, err in 
reducing alimony by one-half of the original award? 
III.		 Did the family court abuse its discretion in providing for an automatic 
decrease in alimony nearly two and a half years in the future based on 
Wife's anticipated eligibility for social security benefits, when such was 
not requested in Husband's pleadings? 
5 Wife's appeal of the Final Order and Interim Orders was held in abeyance 
pending the issuance of the order granting Husband's motion to reconsider. 
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IV.		 Did the family court err in granting Husband's motion to reconsider, 
which was untimely served by mail but timely served by facsimile, and in 
granting relief, sua sponte, under Rule 60(b)(1), SCRCP, more than ten 
days after entry of the Final Order? 
V.		 Did the family court err in failing to require Husband to pay or contribute
to Wife's attorney's fees? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The family court is a court of equity."  Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 
S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).  "Article V, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution 
provides in relevant part that our appellate jurisdiction in cases of equity requires 
that we 'review the findings of fact as well as the law.'"  Id.  In appeals from the 
family court, appellate courts review factual and legal issues de novo.  Simmons v.
Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).  "De novo review 
permits appellate court fact-finding, notwithstanding the presence of evidence 
supporting the [family] court's findings."  Lewis, 392 S.C. at 390, 709 S.E.2d at 
654–55. "However, this broad scope of review does not require [the appellate 
court] to disregard the findings of the family court."  Id. at 384, 709 S.E.2d at 651 
(quoting Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 479, 682 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2009)). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I.		 Jurisdiction to Modify Alimony 
Wife contends the parties' Agreement deprives the family court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to modify Husband's obligation to pay Wife $8,000 per month of 
permanent, periodic alimony.   
South Carolina Code sections 20-3-130(B)(1) and 20-3-170 (2014) provide the 
family court subject matter jurisdiction to modify periodic alimony payments.  
Further, section 20-3-130(G) states in relevant part:  "The parties may agree in 
writing if properly approved by the court to make the payment of alimony as set 
forth in items (1) through (6) of subsection (B) nonmodifiable and not subject to 
subsequent modification by the court." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(G) (2014) 
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(emphasis added). "While the family court normally has the authority to modify 
alimony, once an alimony agreement that specifically disallows modification is 
approved by the court and merged into a judicial order, it is binding on the parties 
and the court and is not subject to modification."  Degenhart v. Burriss, 360 S.C. 
497, 500–01, 602 S.E.2d 96, 97–98 (Ct. App. 2004); Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 
348, 353, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983) ("The parties may specifically agree that the 
amount of alimony may not ever be modified by the court . . . ."); Croom v. 
Croom, 305 S.C. 158, 161, 406 S.E.2d 381, 383 (Ct. App. 1991)).
In Degenhart, the parties executed a written separation agreement in 1999, which 
was incorporated into their divorce decree following a one-year separation.  360 
S.C. at 499, 602 S.E.2d at 97.  The agreement stated: 
Husband agrees to pay Wife alimony in the amount of 
$2,500.00 per month payable on the 1st day of each 
month beginning with the month of September, 1999 for 
a period of the earlier of seven years or upon the 
remarriage of Wife. . . . The provisions of this 
[agreement] shall not be modified or changed except by 
mutual consent and agreement of the parties expressed in 
writing. 
Id.  The husband initiated an action for termination of his alimony obligation in 
2002 based on the wife's cohabitation with another man.  Id. at 500, 602 S.E.2d at 
97. Based on the terms of the agreement and the law of alimony modification, the 
family court determined it did not have the authority to modify alimony.  This 
court affirmed, holding:
While this agreement does not expressly state that the 
family court cannot modify the agreement, it is clear and 
specific about how the agreement can be modified, that 
being "by mutual consent and agreement of the parties 
expressed in writing."  Because the family court "must 
enforce an unambiguous contract according to its terms
regardless of its wisdom or folly, apparent 
unreasonableness, or the parties' failure to guard their 
rights carefully, "we see no reason to require "magic 
words" for an unambiguous agreement to gain efficacy.  
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Lindsay v. Lindsay, 328 S.C. 329, 340, 491 S.E.2d 583, 
589 (Ct. App. 1997). The agreement here, by stating that 
its terms "shall not be modified or changed except by 
mutual consent," clearly denies the family court the 
jurisdiction to modify the agreement by its own authority 
or at the behest of only one of the parties.  Therefore, it 
was properly enforced. 
Id. at 501, 602 S.E.2d at 98. 
In Croom, this court reversed the modification of an alimony obligation based on a 
finding of changed circumstances because a clause in the parties' court-approved 
agreement provided that "the terms and conditions of the agreement and any court 
order approving it shall not be modifiable by the parties or any court without the 
written consent of the Husband and Wife."  305 S.C. at 159, 406 S.E.2d at 382.   
 
Wife contends that paragraph D of the Approval, Non-modification and 
Enforcement Section of the Agreement deprives the family court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to modify Husband's obligation to pay Wife $8,000 monthly in 
permanent, periodic alimony pursuant to paragraph B of the Spousal Support 
Section of the Agreement. We disagree and find paragraph E of the Spousal 
Support Section permits modification.  
 
Unlike the non-modification provisions in Croom and Degenhart, it appears that 
paragraph E of the Spousal Support Section contemplates that alimony could be 
judicially modified in the future based on a change of circumstance, as long as a 
period of three years had passed since the family court approved the Agreement.  
Moreover, the Agreement provides that if Husband's annual total income falls 
below $500,000, alimony is modifiable even if the three-year period has not 
passed. Paragraph E goes on to state that if Husband conveys any of his interest in 
Gilliam & Associates "in any form . . . whatsoever which provides a benefit to 
[Husband] and which reduces his income to below [$500,000] per year, [Husband] 
acknowledges that this conveyance shall be subject to review by the Family Court 
for the Second Judicial Circuit for the purposes of a reduction of alimony." 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, we find the possibility of Husband's conveyance of 
Gilliam & Associates was anticipated by the parties as a potential means for 
modification of alimony, and the Agreement does not provide a time limitation 
within which Husband must seek modification if such a sale were to occur.  
 
24 

  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1999, when the family court approved the Agreement, Husband's total annual 
income was $1,541,081. When Husband filed for modification of alimony in 2010 
(well after he disposed of his interest in Gilliam & Associates), his annual income
was $83,204. The language of the Agreement demonstrates that what the parties 
anticipated—namely, that the parties agreed to the court's reconsideration of 
Husband's alimony obligation if Husband disposed of his interest in Gilliam & 
Associates and his annual income fell below $500,000—is exactly what occurred.  
Thus, we find the language of the agreement does not unambiguously deny the 
family court jurisdiction to modify alimony under such circumstances.   
Furthermore, in section III of the Agreement, titled "[Equitable Apportionment]," 
sub-paragraph A.3 states that Husband agreed to pay Wife $735,000 within ninety 
days of the Agreement's approval as a portion of her equitable interest in the estate.  
The payment was to survive Wife's death.  Sub-paragraph A.3 goes on to state, 
"[s]aid payment is not modifiable for any reason and is separate from and in 
addition to payments of alimony.  The Family Court shall not have jurisdiction to 
modify or terminate this payment for any reason."  The Agreement's language is 
clear and unambiguous that this particular payment could not be modified.  Such 
language is absent from the Spousal Support Section, further demonstrating that 
the parties did not intend to make alimony forever non-modifiable.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the family court's decision as to its jurisdiction to modify alimony. 
II. Reduction of Alimony 
Wife further argues that even if the family court had jurisdiction to modify 
alimony, it erred in reducing alimony or, alternatively, erred in reducing alimony 
by one-half of the original award from $8,000 to $4,000 per month.   
South Carolina Code section 20-3-170 provides, in pertinent part: 
Whenever any husband or wife, pursuant to a judgment 
of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, has been 
required to make his or her spouse any periodic payments 
of alimony and the circumstances of the parties or the 
financial ability of the spouse making the periodic 
payments shall have changed since the rendition of such 
judgment, either party may apply to the court which 
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rendered the judgment for an order and judgment 
decreasing or increasing the amount of such alimony 
payments or terminating such payments and the court, 
after giving both parties an opportunity to be heard and to 
introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall make such 
order and judgment as justice and equity shall require, 
with due regard to the changed circumstances and the 
financial ability of the supporting spouse, decreasing or 
increasing or confirming the amount of alimony provided 
for in such original judgment or terminating such 
payments. . . . 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-170(A) (2014) (emphases added).  "Once a court sets the 
amount of periodic alimony, that amount may be modified under the guidelines of 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-170 (1985)." Fuller v. Fuller, 397 S.C. 155, 163, 723 
S.E.2d 235, 239 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Sharps v. Sharps, 342 S.C. 71, 75, 535 
S.E.2d 913, 916 (2000)). In Fuller, this court explained: 
To justify modification of an alimony award, the changes 
in circumstances must be substantial or material.  
Moreover, the change in circumstances must be 
unanticipated, and the party seeking modification has the 
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
an unforeseen change has occurred.  As a general rule, a 
court hearing an application for a change in alimony 
should look not only to see if the substantial change was 
contemplated by the parties, but most importantly 
whether the amount of alimony in the original decree 
reflects the expectation of that future occurrence.  Many 
of the same considerations relevant to the initial setting 
of an alimony award may be applied in the modification 
context as well, including the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage, each party's earning capacity, and 
the supporting spouse's ability to continue to support the 
other spouse. 
[W]hen a payor spouse seeks to reduce support 
obligations based on his diminished income, a court 
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should consider the payor spouse's earning capacity.  
Where a payor spouse's actual income compared to his or 
her earning capacity is at issue, the court must closely 
examine the payor spouse's good faith and reasonable 
explanation for the decreased income.  However, a payor 
spouse can be found to be voluntarily underemployed 
even in the absence of a bad faith motivation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, it is clear that Husband has had a substantial reduction in income 
since he sold his shares in Gilliam & Associates.  However, we question whether 
this was really an "unanticipated" and "unforeseen change" based on the language 
of the Spousal Support Section of the Agreement (discussed above).  See Fuller, 
397 S.C. at 163, 723 S.E.2d at 239.  From 1998 through 2008, alimony as a 
percentage of Husband's income has varied—6.80% of his income in 1998; 
44.56% of his income in 2003; 5.23% of his income in 2006; 49.96% of his 
income in 2009; 177.85% of his income in 2010; and 208.37% of his income in 
2011. 
Husband claims he cannot continue to pay Wife $8,000 a month in alimony and 
meet his other financial obligations.  Husband's most recent financial declaration 
shows his monthly gross income is $16,070.  His monthly payroll deductions are 
$568, so his net monthly income is $15,502.  His monthly expenses total $22,026, 
which includes $8,000 for spousal support, a $5,282 residential mortgage payment, 
and $1,531 in taxes and insurance on his residence. 
Wife was not working when the case was tried in 2012, and she had not worked for 
the previous twenty-three years.  Wife attended Winthrop University for less than 
two years, where she majored in elementary education; she neither obtained her 
degree nor has she ever taught school.  When Wife last worked as a secretary in 
1989, computers were not common.  She testified at trial that she is not computer 
savvy and does not have a personal email.  In order to return to the workforce as a 
secretary, Wife would likely have to go back to school and receive additional 
training. However, Wife testified that she has not looked for a job since 1999.  
We, like the trial court, are concerned that $8,000 in alimony per month has served 
as a disincentive for Wife to improve her employment potential. 
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Excluding alimony, Wife's financial declaration showed $154 in gross monthly 
income from dividends and interest.  Wife's financial advisor testified Wife could 
draw $1,322.63 per month from an annuity and that she was eligible to take 
distributions from her IRA; however, he advised her not to do so based on her life 
expectancy. If Wife received no alimony and liquidated her approximately 
$838,000 in assets,6 she estimated the money would last approximately seven years 
at her current rate of a little over $5,000 in monthly expenses.  Based on the 
originally agreed upon $8,000 per month in alimony, Wife's deductions reflected in 
her financial declaration (including taxes, health insurance, life and long-term care 
insurance, and retirement) totaled $3,151 per month, resulting in a net income of 
$5,003 per month.  Wife testified that her expenses were $5,293 per month, 
including $550 per month for anticipated loan payments on a new car to replace 
her 2003 Toyota 4-Runner that had 158,400 miles and needed major repairs, and a 
$626 payment for maintenance of her household.7 
Based on the foregoing, we agree with Wife's argument that the family court 
abused its discretion in reducing alimony from $8,000 to $4,000.  It is clear from 
the record, however, that Husband has had a substantial reduction in income since 
selling his shares in Gilliam & Associates.  Thus, we find a reduction from
$8000.00 to $6000.00 per month to be more appropriate based upon the 
circumstances of this case and the parties' respective financial positions. Such a 
reduction is fair and in keeping with the loss of income Husband established due to 
the sale of his company shares.   
6 In its Final Order, the family court pointed out that Wife failed to include liquid 
assets of approximately $105,000 in life insurance cash value on her financial 
declaration.  In Wife's appellate brief, she states that these funds were inadvertently 
omitted from the $733,374 total value of Wife's property listed on her financial 
declaration submitted at trial.  The life insurance cash value appeared on her 
financial declaration dated August 18, 2010.  Wife testified she was not trying to
deceive the court and that the omission was an oversight, which was corroborated 
by her financial advisor. 
7 Wife testified that $626 per month for household maintenance was higher than 
usual because she had to replace the roof, all of the windows, and several walls and 
had to have work done on her kitchen and a bathroom due to a mold and mildew 
problem. 
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III. Anticipated Eligibility for Social Security 
Wife further argues that if the family court had jurisdiction to modify alimony, it 
abused its discretion in providing for an automatic decrease in alimony almost two 
and a half years in the future based on Wife's anticipated eligibility to receive 
social security benefits.  Wife additionally contends Husband did not plead for a 
reduction of alimony on this ground.  We find this issue is preserved; however, we 
agree that the family court erred in reducing alimony based on Wife's future 
anticipated benefits eligibility. 
"It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must 
have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate 
review." Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 330, 730 
S.E.2d 282, 286 (2012) (citation omitted). 
In his amended complaint, Husband alleged: 
Additionally, [Wife] is or soon will be of age to draw 
down on her own retirements and she is or soon will be 
able to obtain Social Security, based on [Husband's]
earnings, all of which will increase [Wife's] income, 
while at the same time, her expenses have reduced.  
[Husband] would further allege that, particularly 
combined with his substantial reduction in income, these 
circumstances support a dramatic reduction (or even 
termination) in his alimony obligation and he would ask 
that this [c]ourt issue an Order allowing the same . . . .  
In response, Wife filed an amended answer and counterclaims in which she denied 
these allegations.  At trial, Husband testified and pled that in addition to asking for 
a reduction in alimony to $4,000 per month, he also wanted the judge to include in 
the Final Order that alimony would be reduced when Wife became eligible for 
social security.  Wife's lawyer did not object to this testimony; however, he did 
cross-examine Husband about this request: 
Q: Okay.  Now, about done.  Yesterday, you were asked 
by Mr. O'Connell how you wanted to see this case shake 
out, and you said reduce my alimony to [$4,000], less 
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Social Security when [Wife] is able to get it; is that 
correct? 
A: That was what I said. 
Q: Okay.  Social Security for either you or Cathy was on 
the books in a law back in 1999, wasn’t it? 
A: I don’t know. 
Q: Social Security has been around since the '40's, 
hadn’t it? 
A: Social Security has. I don’t know about individual 
laws of Social Security, no. 
Q: Okay.  But if it was a law then, you're presumed to 
know it; wouldn’t you agree? 
A: No sir. 
Wife introduced testimony at trial on the issue of the automatic reduction of her 
alimony based on the amount of social security she would be eligible to receive 
when she turned sixty-two.  Wife was questioned by Husband's attorney and by her 
own attorney on the issue. 
"Questions concerning alimony rest within the sound discretion of the family court 
judge whose conclusion will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of 
discretion."  Degenhart, 360 S.C. at 500, 602 S.E.2d at 97 (citing Bryson v. 
Bryson, 347 S.C. 221, 224, 553 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Ct. App. 2001); Bannen v. 
Bannen, 286 S.C. 24, 26, 331 S.E.2d 379, 380 (Ct. App. 1985)).  "An abuse of 
discretion occurs when the decision is controlled by some error of law or is based 
on findings of fact that are without evidentiary support."  Id. at 500, 602 S.E.2d at 
97 (citing Bryson, 347 S.C. at 224, 553 S.E.2d at 495; McKnight v. McKnight, 283 
S.C. 540, 543, 324 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1984)).
The Final Order provides:
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According to his income projections, $200,277.71 is the 
maximum annual income [Husband] will have for the 
remainder of his life.  In the year 2020, his projected 
income will be $150,996.18. Annual alimony of $48,000 
is 32% of this 2020 income.  His projected income for 
the year 2024 is $116,652.  Alimony of $48,000 per year 
is 41% of this amount.  Given these projections, this 
Court also believes it is appropriate that [Wife's] alimony 
should be further reduced by the amount of Social 
Security for which she will become eligible at age 62, 
without regard to whether [Wife] applies for or actually 
receives Social Security benefits.  Reducing [Husband's] 
alimony by the amount of Social Security for which 
[Wife] will be eligible will ease the financial burden on 
[Husband].  For example, in 2024, if [Wife's] Social 
Security benefit is $11,000 per year, [Husband's] alimony 
obligation would be $36,900 per year.  This would 
represent about 32% of his projected income instead of 
41%. This adjustment is infinitely fair. 
Wife cites several cases holding that it is error for the family court to order 
increases or decreases in alimony based on future events.  In Prince v. Prince, 285 
S.C. 203, 328 S.E.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1985), our court reversed the family court's 
automatic decrease in alimony, stating, "It is not known what conditions may exist 
in six or twelve months; future conditions could call for either an increase or a 
decrease in the award."  Id. at 205, 328 S.E.2d at 666. In support of its holding, 
this court quoted Shafer v. Shafer, 283 S.C. 205, 320 S.E.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1984), 
in which a child support award providing for an automatic increase after one year 
was reversed: "By providing for an automatic increase in child support, the trial 
judge arbitrarily increased the amount of support without a showing of a change of 
conditions." Prince, 285 S.C. at 205, 328 S.E.2d at 665–66 (citing Shafer, 283 
S.C. at 209, 328 S.E.2d at 733).  Wife also cites Sharps, in which our supreme 
court held that "[b]ecause a court cannot always know what conditions will exist in 
the future, it would be arbitrary to automatically increase alimony or child support 
in the far distant future based on the happening of anticipated events."  342 S.C. at 
77, 535 S.E.2d at 916.  While we acknowledge that these cases differ from the case 
at hand, they are helpful to our analysis. 
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Under the present law of the United States, citizens are able to collect Social 
Security at age sixty-two. This is not a highly speculative future event.  Under the 
terms of the Final Order, even if Congress were to change the law to increase the 
age for Social Security eligibility, Wife's alimony would not decrease until she is 
actually eligible to collect Social Security. 
Regardless, we find the family court abused its discretion in providing for an 
automatic decrease in alimony almost two and a half years in the future based on 
Wife's anticipated initial eligibility for social security benefits at age sixty-two.  
See, e.g., Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 453, 759 S.E.2d 419, 424 (2014) 
(discussing social security benefits a spouse is actually receiving as opposed to 
"future, yet-unclaimed social security benefits").8  We are further concerned that 
the family court based its decision on Husband's income projections and 
anticipated loss of income—factors already considered in the court's decision to 
reduce Husband's monthly alimony obligation.9 
IV. Rules 5(b)(1) and 60(b)(1), SCRCP 
Wife further asserts that the family court erred in granting Husband's motion to
reconsider because the motion was untimely served by mail and ineffectively 
served by facsimile.  Specifically, Wife contends the family court erred in granting 
the motion sua sponte under Rule 60(b)(1), SCRCP, more than ten days after entry 
of the Final Order. We agree in part, but affirm in light of the parties' stipulation 
(discussed below) that Wife's counsel actually received the fax within the ten-day 
service period. 
"A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order."  Rule 59(e), SCRCP; 
accord Rule 52(b), SCRCP (similarly providing that a motion to amend a judgment 
8 Nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting the family court from
considering at an appropriate hearing any social security benefits Wife is actually 
receiving once she elects to receive such benefits. 
9 Of additional concern is the family court's decision to reduce Husband's alimony 
obligation by the amount of social security benefits for which Wife would become
eligible at age sixty-two, even if she chose to defer receiving these benefits beyond 
her initial eligibility date.   
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must be made "not later than 10 days after receipt of written notice of entry of 
judgment . . . ."); see also Diamond Jewelers, Inc. v. Naegele Outdoor Advert. Co., 
290 S.C. 260, 349 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (requiring post-trial motions filed under 
Rules 52(b) and 59(e), SCRCP, to be served not later than ten days after receipt of 
notice of entry of the judgment). 
Whenever under these rules service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an 
attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the 
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be 
made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him
at his last known address or, if no address is known, by 
leaving it with the clerk of court.  Delivery of a copy 
within this rule means:  handing it to the attorney or to 
the party; or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other 
person in charge thereof; or, if there be no one in charge, 
leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office 
is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving 
a copy at his dwelling place or usual place of abode with 
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing of all 
pleadings and papers subsequent to service of the original 
summons and complaint. 
Rule 5(b)(1), SCRCP. 
The Final Order was filed on November 30, 2012.  On December 12, 2012, 
Husband served Wife's counsel with a motion to reconsider via facsimile.  In his 
motion, Husband asked the family court to retroactively reduce his monthly 
alimony in the amount of $4,000 to September 12, 2011 (the date that the original 
trial was scheduled to begin).  On December 27, 2012, the family court sent 
instructions for an order granting Husband's motion to counsel for both parties via 
facsimile, and directed counsel for Husband to draft an order consistent with the 
instructions. Husband's counsel submitted his proposed order via email to the 
family court and counsel for Wife on January 2, 2013.  The court granted 
Husband's motion to reconsider by order signed on January 3, 2013, and filed on 
January 14, 2013. 
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On January 22, 2013, Wife filed a motion to reconsider, in which she asked the 
family court to alter, amend, modify, stay, vacate, or grant relief from its January 
14, 2013 order. Wife asserted three grounds for the motion:  (1) Husband's motion 
was untimely because it was not received by mail by the Wife until December 27, 
2012, and therefore, was procedurally barred; (2) Husband's service by facsimile 
on December 12, 2012, was ineffective; and (3) Wife was not given an opportunity 
to be heard on Husband's motion.  In support of her motion, counsel for Wife, H. 
Grady Brown (Brown), submitted an affidavit.  In his affidavit, Brown stated 
"[Husband's] [m]otion initially was transmitted to me via facsimile on December 
12, 2012 . . . ." Brown also stated that the motion to reconsider arrived by mail at 
his office on December 27, 2012. This information was also provided to the 
family court by way of stipulation on September 26, 2013.  The parties stipulated, 
"To the best of [Brown's] recollection, he saw and reviewed the fax of [Husband's]
[m]otion on December 12, 2012." 
On February 2, 2013, Husband filed and served his return to Wife's January 23, 
2013 motion.  Husband asserted that his motion to reconsider was timely,
effectively, and actually served and filed, and therefore, was not procedurally 
barred. On February 20, 2013, the family court issued an order allowing Wife to 
respond to Husband's motion and staying his January 14, 2013 order.  Wife did so 
on March 4, 2013. Ultimately, the family court held that Husband believed he had 
timely delivered the motion in an appropriate manner, as he stamped the fax copy 
with the words "Certificate of Service", signed it, and dated it December 12, 2012.   
In Trowell v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety, "this court declined to 
hold that the facsimile of an agency's final decision regarding an employee 
grievance constituted proper service for the purpose of initiating the time frame in 
which the employee had to file his appeal."  White v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 392 S.C. 247, 253, 708 S.E.2d 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Trowell, 
384 S.C. 232, 235–37, 681 S.E.2d 893, 895–96 (Ct. App. 2009).  In Trowell, Scott 
Trowell, a highway patrolman, was suspended without pay for forty hours and 
reassigned to a different patrol unit. Trowell, 384 S.C. at 233, 681 S.E.2d at 894. 
Trowell filed a grievance with the Department of Public Safety (the Department).  
Id.  Notice of the Department's decision upholding the suspension was initially sent 
to Trowell's attorney by fax on February 2, 2005, with a notation indicating the 
decision would also be sent by certified mail.  Id. at 234, 681 S.E.2d at 894. 
Trowell's attorney received the Department's decision by certified mail on
February 7, 2005. Id. at 234, 681 S.E.2d at 894–95. 
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Trowell's counsel admit[ted] the facsimile was received 
by his office on February 2; however, because facsimiles 
are not ordinarily used to accomplish notice of a decision 
by any department, agency, or court, counsel 
maintain[ed] he did not look at or consider the fax until 
the certified copy of the letter was received by his office 
on February 7, at which time he began the next step of 
the appeals process. 
Id. at 237, 681 S.E.2d at 896. On February 15, 2005, Trowell's attorney faxed an 
appeal from the Department's decision to the Human Resource Management 
Division of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board (Human Resources).  Id.
at 234, 681 S.E.2d at 895. "On March 4, 2005, [the director of Human Resources] 
notified Trowell, via letter, that his appeal was untimely because Trowell had 
failed to file it within ten calendar days of receipt of [the Department's] February 2 
facsimile, pursuant to section 8-17-330 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2008)."  
Id.
The Trowell court noted, "the agency's interpretation of its grievance procedure . . . 
created a rule which it had, admittedly, never before employed or sought to 
enforce. Moreover, the rule that the time for an appeal began to toll upon service 
by facsimile is not included in any written materials or guidelines available to the 
public or the bar."  Id. at 236–37, 681 S.E.2d at 896.  This court further observed 
that the Department's decision "arbitrarily created a trap for the unwary petitioner.  
As a result, we believe the substantial rights of Trowell were prejudiced due to the 
arbitrary and capricious nature of the agency's interpretation of its grievance 
procedure." Id. at 237, 681 S.E.2d at 896. 
In Dill-Ball Company v. Bailey, 103 S.C. 233, 87 S.E. 1010 (1916), a sheriff's 
agent placed suit papers in the defendant's mailbox; the defendant's servant 
removed them and later handed them to the defendant.  Id. at 1011.  The defendant 
acknowledged to the sheriff that he had received the papers from his servant, and 
the sheriff told him what the papers were regarding.  Id. Although there was no 
proper re-service, the court held that service was effective.  Id.; see also
Humphries v. Spitz, 284 S.C. 521, 523, 327 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(providing the same ruling, citing Dill-Ball as authority). 
Actual and timely service defeats any claim that service was not in accordance 
with the Rules. We note that Rule 5(b)(1), SCRCP, neither authorizes nor 
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prohibits delivery of a written notice by facsimile.  However, the crux of the Rule 
is for the movant to deliver a copy to opposing counsel.  Here, the record, 
including Brown's affidavit and the parties' stipulation, reflects that Husband's 
motion was timely and actually received by Brown's office on December 12, 2012, 
within the meaning and intent of Rule 5(b)(1), SCRCP.  Unlike the facts in 
Trowell, Wife's counsel did not claim that he took no action to oppose Husband's 
motion because he considered service by facsimile on December 12, 2012 to be 
ineffective. We believe that if Wife's counsel had considered the service by 
facsimile ineffective on December 12, 2012, he would have filed a motion with the 
family court when he received the court's instructions for its order on December 
27, 2012, or when he received the proposed order on January 2, 2013.  Wife's 
counsel made no complaint about untimely or improper service until filing her 
January 22nd motion.10  
V. Attorney's Fees 
Wife argues the family court erred in failing to require Husband to pay or 
contribute toward her litigation fees and costs.  We agree. 
"In determining whether an attorney's fees should be awarded, the following 
factors should be considered: (1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's 
fee; (2) the beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective 
financial conditions; and (4) the effect of the attorney's fees on each party's 
standard of living." E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476–77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 
(1992) (citation omitted).  In determining the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, 
the family court should consider:  "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; 
(2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; 
(4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; and (6) 
customary legal fees for similar services."  Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 
161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991). 
 
                                        
 
10 We agree with Wife that it was error for the family court to invoke Rule 60(b) on 
its own initiative. See Rule 60(b), SCRCP (stating that "on motion and upon such 
terms as are just" the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a 
final judgment or order in certain limited situations) (emphasis added)).  However, 
the Rule 59(e) ruling—as well as the parties' stipulation that Wife's counsel "saw 
and reviewed" the faxed motion within the 10-day period—is dispositive on the 
timeliness question. 
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Here, both parties sought attorney's fees in their pleadings.  At trial, counsel for 
Wife submitted an affidavit for attorney's fees incurred during the course of 
litigation. Pursuant to the affidavit, Wife incurred $64,670.71 in attorney's fees, 
which included an estimate of an additional forty-five hours for the fees and costs 
estimated to be incurred during the week of trial.  Wife's counsel stated her hourly
rate was $200, and she spent approximately 232 hours, with some time billed by 
her paralegal at seventy-five dollars per hour, defending Wife's case. In addition, 
Wife spent approximately $21,000 in out-of-pocket costs for depositions, 
appraisals, and other materials, and she paid $12,000 to a financial advisor expert 
who provided litigation support.  Wife's fees and costs total approximately 
$97,670.
Notwithstanding the fact that Wife was awarded $2,000 in temporary attorney's 
fees in connection with a motion to reopen discovery filed by Husband, the family 
court ordered both parties to pay their own attorney's fees.  The family court 
concluded that the attorney's fees incurred by each party were reasonable and 
necessary:
This [c]ourt has reviewed the affidavits of counsel for 
both parties. They have documented their services 
adequately and it appears that the attorneys' fees both 
have requested are appropriate.  The [c]ourt considered 
statutory and case law of the State, including but not
limited to Glasscock v. Glasscock and E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 
as well as the factors set forth in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. This [c]ourt approves the fees that both 
attorneys charged their clients. 
This [c]ourt has further reviewed documentation of the 
negotiations between the parties and their attempt to 
resolve this matter prior to [t]rial.  They came very close 
to being able to resolve this matter without the necessity 
of litigation. It appears that litigation was necessary in 
this matter.  It appears there is give and take by each
party in their efforts to resolve this between themselves.  
Based on these findings [it] is appropriate for each party 
to assume their own legal fees and costs. 
37 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Although the weight of the beneficial results obtained initially weighed in 
Husband's favor, the parties' abilities to pay, their respective financial conditions, 
and the effect of attorney's fees on each party's standard of living supported Wife's
fee application. We recognize that "the threshold question of entitlement [to fees] 
always turns, at least in part, on the beneficial results obtained."  Buist v. Buist, 410 
S.C. 569, 579, 766 S.E.2d 381, 386 (2014) (Pleicones, C.J., concurring).  Where 
beneficial results are reversed on appeal, the attorney's fee award, or lack thereof, 
must also be reconsidered.  See Crossland, 408 S.C. at 460, 759 S.E.2d at 428; 
Rogers v. Rogers, 343 S.C. 329, 540 S.E.2d 840 (2001) ("[S]ince the beneficial 
result obtained by counsel is a factor in awarding attorney's fees, when that result is 
reversed on appeal, the attorney's fee award must also be reconsidered.").  
Rule 26(a), SCRFR, requires that "[a]n order or judgment pursuant to an 
adjudication in a domestic relations case shall set forth the specific findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to support the court's decision."  Here, the family court's 
order does not satisfy Rule 26(a) and is insufficient to support its reason for 
declining to award Wife attorney's fees; however, we find it unnecessary to remand 
the fee question because the record is sufficient for this court to make its own 
findings.  See Holcombe v. Hardee, 304 S.C. 522, 524, 405 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1991) 
("[W]hen an Order is issued in violation of Rule 26(a), [an appellate court] may 
remand the matter to the trial court or, where the record is sufficient, make its own 
findings of fact in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence."). 
Here, Husband was in a better financial position to pay his own attorney's fees and 
to contribute toward a substantial portion of Wife's fees.  Husband's net worth 
increased from approximately $1 million at the time of the divorce to $3.3 to $3.4 
million at the time of the alimony modification trial. During that same period, 
Wife's net worth decreased from approximately $1 million to $837,437, and she 
had redeemed a total of $86,651 from her investments to pay her litigation 
expenses. Husband also liquidated assets and drew from an equity line in the 
months prior to trial, both to pay his litigation costs and to retire certain debts.  Of 
the $547,000 in this available cash, he retired some $300,000 in debt, including 
$150,000 in attorney's fees.  There was no explanation regarding the expenditure of 
the remaining $247,000. Wife's financial declaration for trial reflected some 
$3,000 in her checking account, while Husband had a combined balance of over 
$26,000 in his checking accounts.  
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In light of the beneficial results obtained by Wife on appeal, the parties' respective 
financial conditions and abilities to pay their litigation expenses, as well as the 
effect that paying attorney's fees will have on each party's standard of living, we 
find it appropriate for Husband to pay $48,835.00 (one-half) of Wife's attorney's 
fees and costs. 
 
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the family court's finding that it had 
jurisdiction to modify the alimony award, but we modify the family court's 
alimony reduction. We find a reduction from $8000.00 to $6000.00 per month to 
be appropriate based upon the circumstances of this case and the parties' respective 
financial positions. We reverse the automatic decrease in alimony based on Wife's 
anticipated initial eligibility for social security benefits at age sixty-two.  Finally, 
we reverse the family court's decision as to attorney's fees, and find Husband shall 
contribute $48,835.00 toward payment of Wife's attorney's fees and costs. 
Accordingly, the orders of the family court are AFFIRMED IN PART and 
REVERSED IN PART. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT, J., concur. 
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MCDONALD, J.:  In this marital litigation, Lori Dandridge Stoney (Wife) 
contends the family court erred in (1) permitting Theodore D. Stoney Jr. (Brother) 
to intervene or, in the alternative, failing to control the extent of this intervention; 
(2) denying Wife's motion to reopen on the basis of newly discovered evidence; (3) 
imputing income of only $100,000 per year to Richard S.W. Stoney Sr. (Husband); 
(4) failing to award Wife alimony; (5) failing to make a proper child support 
determination; (6) failing to require that Husband maintain life insurance/other 
security; (7) erroneously apportioning the marital property in several respects; (8) 
failing to find Wife has a special equity in certain businesses; (9) declining to hold 
Husband in contempt; (10) failing to grant Wife a divorce on the ground of 
adultery; and (11) failing to award Wife attorney's fees.  We reverse and remand for 
a new trial. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
On October 12, 1996, Husband and Wife married in Berkeley County.  Prior to the 
marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement.1  The parties have one 
child together (Child).2    
 
At the beginning of the marriage, Husband and Wife practiced law together; 
however, Wife began her own practice in 1997.  Around this time, the parties 
opened a restaurant called the Boathouse at Breach Inlet (BHBI)3 on the Isle of 
                                        
1 Husband produced neither the original nor a signed copy of the prenuptial 
agreement; however, he did include a copy of an unsigned prenuptial agreement as 
an exhibit to his affidavit. 
   
2 Child was nine-years-old when this case was filed and twelve at the time of trial. 
 
3  At the date of filing, the ownership structure of BHBI was as follows:  
 
Husband—70% 

Brother—10% 

Wife—5%
	 
Richard Stoney Jr. (in Trust)—5% 

Child (in Trust with Wife as Trustee)—5% 
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Palms, and Husband eventually stopped practicing law to focus on the restaurant.  
Wife's practice of law also became subordinate to the family's needs and operation 
of the parties' business ventures.4 
BHBI was very successful from the time it opened, and it became the source from 
which Husband financed his other ventures.  Husband purchased four other 
restaurants and various businesses during the course of the marriage, making 
"loans" from BHBI to the new entities.  These businesses were managed by 
Husband's company, Crew Carolina. 
The couple's second restaurant was the Boathouse at East Bay Street (BHEB) in 
downtown Charleston.  Although BHEB broke even, Husband closed the restaurant
in January 2009. As of December 31, 2008, BHEB had a net asset value of 
negative $141,048. Husband and Brother jointly owned the real property on which 
BHEB was located.5 
In 2003, the couple opened the Boathouse at Lake Julian (BHLJ) in Asheville, 
North Carolina, which closed in July 2008. As of December 31, 2008, BHLJ had a 
net asset value of negative $1,297,939, which included an allocation of 
$474,792.78 of a Carolina First/DI Carolinas consolidation loan.  In 2004, the 
couple purchased Carolinas, an existing restaurant located on Exchange Street in 
downtown Charleston, which they subsequently renovated.  As of December 31, 
2008, Carolinas had a net asset value of $89,539.  Husband sold Carolinas6 in 
Lawrence Stoney—5% 
4 The parties stipulated that Wife assisted Husband in the operation of the couple's 
restaurants and businesses.
5 The property was later reopened as another restaurant.   
6 After Wife discovered the impending sale of Carolinas, she filed a motion for 
protection, which resulted in a February 17, 2011 order requiring that Brother's
attorney hold in escrow the remaining proceeds and any funds still in escrow.  At 
trial, Wife testified that she had received nothing from the sale of Carolinas. 
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January 2010 for over $550,000.7  Additionally, Husband advanced funds and 
assisted a third-party with opening Choto, a restaurant in Knoxville, Tennessee.8 
In February of 2009, the parties opened their final restaurant, the Boathouse at Ellis 
Creek (BHEC), which burned to the ground one month later.  Husband received 
over $850,000 in insurance proceeds during the first year the parties were 
separated; however, he did not use this money to rebuild the restaurant.9  Instead, 
these funds were used to satisfy obligations to other creditors and business 
partners. This account was drained by the time of trial.  In his testimony, Husband 
explained, "every dime that I received for Ellis Creek was used to offset the 
massive amount of debt we had, and I believe that the forensic accountants have 
well covered that fact. . . . I am doing everything I can to rebuild Ellis Creek."  
Throughout the trial, Husband referred to "robbing Peter to pay Paul" to keep 
creditors at bay and allow certain businesses to continue operating.
Husband started three additional businesses shortly after Wife filed for divorce:  
Amen Street Fish & Raw Bar, J & S Fish, LLC, and Rice Market.  
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On April 23, 2009, Wife filed an action for divorce seeking sole custody of Child, 
child support, alimony, equitable division, and other relief.  By consent order dated 
May 15, 2009, the family court approved a change of venue from Charleston 
7 The majority of the sale price was paid up front to Husband; however, the buyer 
gave Husband a note, $75,000 of which was paid off prior to trial.  Husband 
stipulated at trial that he paid one of his business partners, Thomas Westfeldt, 
$270,000 from these proceeds, which reduced a $550,000 note held by Westfeldt.  
The remainder of this note is secured by the Isle of Palms property.  
8 Husband has obtained summary judgment and an award of $250,000 against 
Choto's owner; however, the collection of this sum had not yet occurred as of the 
date of oral argument. The family court did not address this judgment in its final 
order.   
9 The property has since reopened as another restaurant.   
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County to Orangeburg County.  That same day, the family court approved a 
consent order sealing the record. 
On June 18, 2009, Husband filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking joint 
custody of Child, enforcement of a prenuptial agreement, equitable division of the 
marital property and debt, and certain other relief.  In addition, Husband sought the 
imputation of income to Wife and to pay reasonable child support pursuant to the 
South Carolina Child Support Guidelines.  
On July 10, 2009, Wife filed a reply and counterclaim, admitting she had signed a 
prenuptial agreement, but alleging it had been lost.  On this same date, the 
Honorable Anne Gue Jones entered a temporary order.  This temporary order 
adopted an agreement titled, "Consent Order Regarding Certain Child Issues," 
which, among other things, awarded custody to Wife and prohibited Husband from 
exposing Child to his paramours.  The other issues raised remained contested.  The 
court granted Wife exclusive use and possession of the couple's condominium in 
Charleston, and required Husband to pay Wife approximately $22,000 per month 
for Wife and Child's expenses. On February 26, 2010, a supplemental temporary 
order was issued, relieving Husband of certain obligations required by the July 10, 
2009 temporary order.
On January 5, 2010, Brother filed a motion to intervene to protect his interests in 
certain real property, business concerns, and debts he asserts he is owed.  The court 
granted Brother's motion to intervene by order dated February 22, 2010, finding 
"[Brother]'s interest in this action outweighs any privacy interest that [Wife]
asserts. . . . [T]he interests of [Brother] and the property which is the subject of 
this action cannot be adequately protected because of the [Husband]'s tenuous 
financial condition."   
On March 4, 2010, Brother filed a third-party complaint, requesting, among other 
things, a determination by the court that his loans to Husband (and to the parties on 
behalf of Husband) constituted marital debt.  Husband answered Brother's 
complaint on March 4, 2010, admitting all of Brother's claims and joining in the 
relief sought by Brother.  Wife answered on March 29, 2010, asserting that she had 
insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations.  On August 2, 2010, the 
family court issued a consent order relieving Husband's counsel.  From this point 
through the two-week trial, Husband acted pro se. 
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During the pendency of this action, Husband was held in willful contempt with 
regard to four petitions and one supplemental petition for rules to show cause, and 
an additional rule remains unresolved. Specifically, Wife initially filed two 
petitions for rules to show cause (Rule 1 and Rule 2a), and a supplemental petition 
(Rule 2b). Rule 1, Rule 2a, and Rule 2b were resolved by order dated February 25, 
2010, in which the family court found Husband in willful contempt for failing "to 
make payments under the Temporary Order, while he had funds to pay for other 
personal expenses on his behalf." 
Wife filed a third rule to show cause (Rule 3) against Husband on January 11, 
2010, regarding a criminal domestic violence situation involving Brother and 
Husband that resulted in physical injury to Wife in Child's presence.  On March 29, 
2010, the family court found Husband to be in willful contempt. Additionally, the 
court required counseling for Husband and Child, appointed a parenting 
coordinator, and authorized Wife to tape her phone conversations with Husband. 
Wife filed two additional petitions for rules to show cause (Rule 4 and Rule 5).  In 
Rule 4, issued on June 29, 2010, Wife alleged that Husband failed to pay her 
regime fees, Wife and Child's uncovered medical/dental expenses, Child's private 
school expenses, and certain credit card obligations.  In Rule 5, issued on October 
8, 2010, Wife alleged Husband exposed Child to his paramour in violation of a 
specific restraining order.10  Both Rule 4 and Rule 5 were resolved by order dated 
January 6, 2011, in which the family court again held Husband in willful contempt.  
Husband was sentenced to ninety days, suspended upon payment of the required 
expenses mentioned above, as well as a payment of $3,000 in attorney's fees to 
Wife's counsel.
Several motions, including Husband's January 25, 2011 motion to declare contempt 
purged, were resolved by order dated March 24, 2011.  In the March 24th order, the 
family court accepted Wife's agreement that Husband could purge his contempt 
sentence, based upon his assertion that he had made arrangements for support 
payments, as well as Husband's payment of the $3,000 in attorney's fees previously
10 The family court found Husband "knowingly, willfully and even defiantly 
exposed the minor child to his paramour and has shown a blatant disregard" for the 
consent order.
45 

  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
ordered. In that same order, the court denied Husband's motion to sell or pledge up 
to ten percent of his interest in BHBI as well as Wife's motion to either purchase 
BHBI or be awarded complete control over the day-to-day operations of the 
business. In a separate order, the family court required Husband and Wife to each 
contribute $5,000 toward a joint court-appointed CPA by March 25, 2011.  
The two-week trial was held March 28–April 1, 2011, and May 23–27, 2011.  
When the trial started, Wife had complied with her $5,000 obligation to the CPA, 
but Husband had not. Wife filed another petition for rule to show cause (Rule 6) 
on May 10, 2011, alleging Husband had failed to pay the previously ordered CPA
fees and attorney's fees.11  Despite Wife's requests, these contempt issues were 
never resolved. On June 17, 2011, after the trial concluded, but before the final 
order was issued, Wife filed a motion to reopen the case based on newly 
discovered evidence. 
On July 18, 2011, the family court entered an interim order, addressing the divorce 
only.  Despite Wife's request for a divorce on the ground of adultery, the court 
granted dissolution on the ground of one year's continuous separation.  On 
September 22, 2011, Wife moved to alter or amend the interim order pursuant to 
Rules 52, 59, and 60, SCRCP, and Rule 2(a), SCRFC.  The family court denied this 
motion by order dated October 15, 2011.  Wife appealed on November 18, 2011.
On July 25, 2011, the family court emailed counsel for Brother, requesting that he 
submit two proposed orders to the court:  one order denying Wife's motion to 
reopen and another setting out the trial court's final order in the case on all 
remaining issues.  Instead, Brother's counsel drafted a single order (Final Order), 
incorporating both the family court's denial of Wife's motion to reopen as well as 
its rulings on the remaining property and support issues. 
Upon receipt of the Final Order, Wife's counsel emailed and wrote the family court 
and opposing counsel, requesting an opportunity to respond to Brother's proposed 
order.  However, the family court ignored this request and without making any 
changes to Brother's submitted proposed order, the court issued its Final Order on 
September 6, 2011. 
11 Husband has not appealed this order of contempt. 
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On September 22, 2011, Wife timely filed a motion to alter or amend the Final 
Order, which the family court denied by order dated November 30, 2011.  Wife 
appealed that Final Order on January 6, 2012.  The two appeals have subsequently 
been consolidated. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I.		 Did the family court err in allowing Brother to intervene and in failing to
control the extent of Brother's intervention? 
II.		 Did the family court err in denying Wife's motion to reopen the case as a 
result of newly discovered evidence? 
III.		 Did the family court err in imputing income of only $100,000 per year to
	
Husband? 

IV.		 Did the family court err in failing to award Wife alimony? 
V.		 Did the family court err in its child support determination? 
VI.		 Did the family court err in failing to require Husband to maintain life 

insurance and other security for alimony and child support? 

VII.		 Did the family court err in identifying, valuing, and apportioning marital 

assets and debts? 

VIII.		 Did the family court err in failing to find Wife has a special equity in 
businesses funded with marital funds by Husband after the date of filing? 
IX.		 Did the family court err in failing to hold Husband in contempt? 
X.		 Did the family court err in failing to grant Wife a divorce on the ground of 
adultery? 
XI.		 Did the family court err in failing to award Wife attorney's fees and litigation 
costs? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The family court is a court of equity."  Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 
S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).  In appeals from the family court, the appellate court 
reviews factual and legal issues de novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 
709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).  "De novo review permits appellate court fact-finding, 
notwithstanding the presence of evidence supporting the trial court's findings."  
Lewis, 392 S.C. at 390, 709 S.E.2d at 654–55 (emphasis omitted).  "However, this 
broad scope of review does not require an appellate court to disregard the factual 
findings below or ignore the fact that the trial judge is in the better position to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses."  Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 387, 
544 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001). "Moreover, the appellant is not relieved of his burden 
of convincing the appellate court the trial judge committed error in his findings."  
Id. at 387–88, 544 S.E.2d at 623.  Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the 
family court unless its decision is controlled by some error of law or the appellant 
satisfies the burden of showing the preponderance of the evidence actually 
supports contrary factual findings by this court.  See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 389–90, 
709 S.E.2d at 654–55. 
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Brother's Intervention 
Wife argues persuasively that the family court erred in its Final Order and decree 
of divorce on a number of bases.  According to Wife, most problematic was "the 
trial court's surrender to the dictates of Husband's brother, the Third Party 
Intervenor, whose control was so great that the trial court instructed his attorney to 
prepare the Final Order in the case, then [signed] that order with no changes 
whatsoever and without allowing Wife's attorneys any input." (footnote omitted). 
Wife contends the family court erred in allowing Brother to enter, and essentially 
control, the litigation. We agree and hold that even if the family court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting intervention, the degree to which the court 
permitted Brother's counsel to involve himself in matters wholly unrelated to those 
in which Brother had a purported interest was certainly erroneous.
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"The decision to grant or deny a motion to join an action pursuant to Rule 19, 
SCRCP, or intervene in an action pursuant to Rule 24, SCRCP, lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court."  Ex parte Gov't Emp.'s Ins. Co. v. Goethe, 373 
S.C. 132, 135, 644 S.E.2d 699, 701 (2007). 
This Court will not disturb the lower court's decision on 
appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is found 
resulting in an error of law. Moreover, the error of law 
must be so opposed to the lower court's sound discretion 
as to amount to a deprivation of the legal rights of the 
party. 
Id. (quoting Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 369 S.C. 433, 633 S.E.2d 143, 146 
(2006)). Rule 24(a), SCRCP, provides: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
"Generally, the rules of intervention should be liberally construed where judicial 
economy will be promoted by declaring the rights of all affected parties."  Ex parte 
Gov't Emp.'s Ins. Co., 373 S.C. at 138, 644 S.E.2d at 702.  Accordingly, this court 
"should consider the practical implications of a decision denying or allowing 
intervention." Id.  "However, a party must have standing to intervene in an action 
pursuant to Rule 24, SCRCP." Id. "A party has standing if the party has a personal 
stake in the subject matter of a lawsuit and is a 'real party in interest.'"  Id. (quoting 
Bailey v. Bailey, 312 S.C. 454, 458, 441 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1994)).  "A real party in 
interest . . . is one who has a real, actual, material or substantial interest in the 
subject matter of the action, as distinguished from one who has only a nominal, 
formal, or technical interest in, or connection with, the action."  Id. (quoting Bailey, 
312 S.C. at 458, 441 S.E.2d at 327).
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Pursuant to the family court's February 22, 2010 order granting intervention, 
Brother was allowed to enter the litigation on the following grounds:  (1) Brother 
was joint owner of some of the marital property, (2) he was co-obligor on certain 
marital debts, (3) he had mortgaged some of his own property to obtain funds for 
Husband's businesses, and (4) he made loans to Husband to protect Husband's 
business interests. Wife notes Brother did not seek to enforce any debts he alleges
were owed to him by Husband until he filed this motion to intervene approximately 
nine months after the marital litigation commenced.  
Wife also argues Brother lacked standing because he was not a "real party in 
interest." As discussed above, a "real party in interest" is one with a "real, actual, 
material or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action."  See id.  In 
support of her claim, Wife cites to Bailey, in which our supreme court held that 
former attorneys for a party to domestic litigation lacked standing to intervene in 
the action with regard to an attorney's fees payment.  312 S.C. at 458, 441 S.E.2d 
at 327. The Bailey court explained that "the real interest lies with the parties in the 
divorce action—the appellants—and they alone have a real propriety interest in the 
subject matter of the proceedings.  We find that [the attorneys'] interest as 
claimants asserting a right to attorney fees is peripheral and not the real interest at 
stake." Id.
Unlike the attorneys in Bailey, we find Brother satisfied the standing requirement 
of Rule 24, SCRCP. The record is replete with evidence that Brother had a 
property interest not only in the marital property, but also in other properties in 
which Wife argues she holds a marital interest.  Brother was a co-obligor of much 
of the marital debt, which was confirmed by the court-appointed CPA, Tracy 
Amos. We also agree with the family court in that considering Husband's tenuous 
financial condition, Brother's interest in the various pieces of property—many of 
which are a substantial part of this litigation—could not be adequately protected 
unless Brother was allowed to intervene. Thus, we find the family court did not 
abuse its discretion in initially determining Brother had an interest in this litigation.   
However, the record establishes that the family court erred in failing to control the 
depth of Brother's intervention.  Throughout the trial, Brother's counsel was 
permitted to interject objections and comments regarding matters that had nothing 
to do with Brother's interests in the litigation.   
50 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, despite Brother's assertions that he had no ownership interest in Rice 
Market, Brother objected to questions regarding Rice Market's ownership, stating it 
"was acquired after the date of filing."  Other examples reflecting Brother's 
unrelated involvement include (1) interrupting Husband when he tried to offer a 
stipulation; (2) "shushing" Husband when he made comments that might be 
adverse only to Husband's case; (3) successfully objecting to the introduction of 
the parenting coordinator's affidavit, despite Husband's statement that he was in 
agreement with it; (5) successfully making objections during the testimony of one 
of Wife's witnesses regarding Husband's false statements to various people about 
Wife's sexuality; and (6) cross-examining a former employee and babysitter of the 
couple regarding marital matters that had nothing to do with Brother or his
financial interests. Of additional concern is that the family court requested that 
Brother's counsel draft the Final Order denying Wife's motion to alter or amend an 
interim order that dealt solely with the parties' grounds for divorce.  
Overall, we find the family court improperly allowed Brother to influence the 
manner in which the assets and debts in the divorce case were distributed between 
Husband and Wife.  Further, the family court's direction that counsel for Brother 
prepare the two orders following trial, which the family court subsequently
approved as its Final Order, confirms the extent of Brother's influence on issues in 
this litigation that in no way involved Brother or his interests, such as custody, 
child support, alimony, and fault.  Cf. Ex parte Gov't Emp's Ins. Co., 373 S.C. 132, 
138–39, 644 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2007) ("GEICO has no real interest in whether 
Cooper and Goethe have a valid common law marriage.  GEICO's interest is in the 
financial implications of the family court's decision, which is peripheral to the 
subject matter before the court."); id. at 139, 644 S.E.2d at 703 ("[T]he subject 
matter of the family court action in the instant case is the validity of a common law 
marriage, which does not involve a determination of insurance benefits.  
Accordingly, GEICO does not have standing to intervene in the family court action 
because it does not have an interest sufficiently related to the subject matter of the 
action."); Slatton v. Slatton, 289 S.C. 128, 129–30, 345 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1986) 
(holding titleholder to automobile was entitled to opportunity to appear as a litigant 
in divorce proceeding and "to offer evidence to protect her property interest.").  
Therefore, we hold that while the granting of the motion to intervene itself may 
have been within the discretion of the family court, the court's actions in repeatedly
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permitting Brother to participate (and even control) certain decisions unrelated to 
the protection of Brother's property interests were erroneous. 
II. Wife's Motion to Reopen the Case 
After the two-week trial concluded, but before the family court issued a ruling, 
Wife moved to reopen the case.  Wife's motion was based on several documents 
she received relating to the sale of a ten-percent share in BHBI to Greg and
Constance Holmes as well as Brother's interest in BHEC.  Wife argued these 
documents are relevant to (1) the alleged debts owed to Brother, (2) the credibility 
of Husband and Brother, and (3) other relevant matters, including a possible 
undisclosed operating and ownership arrangement regarding BHBI.  The family 
court denied Wife's motion to reopen. 
Wife claims that on July 13 and 14, 2011, Constance Holmes gave her a number of 
documents, including the following:
	 A document dated December 21, 2009, from Husband to Greg and 
Constance Holmes regarding a $175,000 loan secured by up to ten
percent of Breach Inlet (BHBI) shares; 
	 A December 22, 2009 memorandum, from J & S Fish, LLC to 
Greg Holmes from Keith Jones12 referencing a $250,000 loan to 
Crew Carolina secured by ten percent of the net restaurant stock of 
BHBI; 
	 A November 23, 2009 promissory note, in the amount of $75,000 
(borrower Rice Market, LCC) to be organized and collateralized by 
up to five percent interest in BHBI; 
	 A document titled "Private Placement Memorandum" on BHEC, 
stating Brother owns fifteen percent; and 
12 Keith Jones is the managing member of J & S Fish, LLC, which is the company 
that operates "The Amen Street Fish and Raw Bar."
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	 A December 23, 2009 promissory note, in the amount of $50,000 
(borrower J & S Fish, LLC, d/b/a Amen Street Fish and Raw Bar) 
to Greg Holmes signed by Keith Jones. 
To reopen a case based on newly discovered evidence, "a movant must establish 
that the newly discovered evidence:  '(1) will probably change the result if a new 
trial is granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been 
discovered before the trial; (4) is material to the issue; and (5) is not merely 
cumulative or impeaching.'" Lanier v. Lanier, 364 S.C. 211, 217, 612 S.E.2d 456, 
459 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting James F. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure
484 (2d ed. 1996)).
These documents are clearly material to at least one property in which Wife claims
she holds an equitable interest and Brother claims a debt.  Despite this (and the fact 
that Husband denied the existence of certain of these documents), the family court 
offered the following unsupported analysis:  (1) the documents would not have 
affected the outcome of the case, (2) they could have been discovered prior to trial, 
and (3) Wife sought to use the documents to impeach Husband and Brother.   
As to the document dated December 21, 2009, Wife contended throughout the trial 
that the money from the Holmes—be it Greg and Constance Holmes or Holmes 
Capital—were loans. On the other hand, Husband and his accountant, Chip 
Robinson, contended Holmes Capital purchased a ten percent interest in BHBI.  In 
sum, either Husband owns sixty versus seventy percent interest in BHBI, or he or 
his businesses owe repayment of the loan to the Holmes.  The family court found 
the net effect of this was immaterial, relying upon its dubious finding that the 
marital estate had a negative net worth. 
The family court's immateriality finding was erroneous, however, because the 
documents, properly considered, would have affected the outcome of the litigation. 
The categorization of the "sale" of assets versus "loans" from Brother (and others),
as well as the manner in which Husband conducted the accounting relating to 
BHBI (the only income producing property found to be marital), were the key 
issues at trial with respect to the valuation of the marital estate and its 
apportionment. 
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For example, the Ellis Creek "Private Placement Memorandum" provides Brother 
was given a fifteen percent interest in BHEC, perhaps with no monetary 
investment in this particular venture.  If this fifteen percent interest was in
repayment of certain loans made by Brother, it should have offset at least some of 
the negative value the family court assigned the marital estate.  Because the family 
court found the marital estate had a negative net worth based in large part upon 
Brother's marital debt allegations, business documents addressing Brother's 
ownership interests in marital assets or business ventures Husband may have 
financed (even in part) with marital funds certainly would have affected the 
outcome of the litigation in a properly conducted trial. 
The Private Placement Memorandum and Rice Market documents are also material 
to Husband's control of BHBI, and his repeated use of this asset to fund subsequent 
business ventures. As noted previously, BHBI was the only remaining income-
producing business that the family court found to be marital property.  And it is not
insignificant that Wife holds her own pre-apportionment five percent interest as 
well as a five percent interest as trustee on behalf of Child.  The family court's 
ruling left Husband in control of not only the only marital income-producing asset, 
but also Wife and Child's non-marital percentage ownership interests.  Thus, it is 
difficult to discern how such documents could not have affected the outcome of the 
litigation. 
Nor can we agree that these documents could have been discovered prior to trial,13 
as the record is replete with evidence that Husband was evasive and uncooperative 
with discovery.  This, along with the family court's repeated refusal to mandate that 
Husband comply with Rule 20, SCRFC's Financial Declaration requirement, 
mandates reversal. 
III. Husband's Imputed Income 
Wife argues the family court erred in imputing income of only $100,000 per year 
to Husband. Specifically, Wife claims the family court "completely disregarded 
13 It is difficult to determine how the family court reached its conclusion that Wife 
could have discovered the documents prior to trial because Husband testified that 
certain of these documents did not exist.
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the overwhelming evidence presented at trial" that Husband's actual income is 
$892,958 per year.  To the extent Husband argues Wife has not preserved the 
imputation issue for review, we disagree.  We find the family court's analysis of 
Husband's income is incomplete and erroneous. 
In Marchant v. Marchant, 390 S.C. 1, 7, 699 S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ct. App. 2010), the 
wife alluded to the fact that the husband was capable of earning more in the final 
hearing; however, she did not request a finding that the husband was voluntarily 
underemployed for the purpose of imputing income and the family court did not 
rule on the issue of income imputation.  Id. This court subsequently determined 
that wife was required to file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to seek a ruling on that 
point, and she failed to do so. Id. 
Here, however, Wife raised the issue of Husband's income several times to the 
family court, and she filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion seeking that the family 
court alter or amend its ruling on this issue.  Additionally, the court-appointed CPA
testified that she neither analyzed Husband's income nor his lifestyle.  Despite 
Wife's repeated requests, Husband was not required to provide a current financial 
declaration at the start of trial or during the two separate trial weeks.14  Throughout 
the two-week trial, Husband referred to a financial declaration that was over a year 
old, and Wife's counsel systematically dismantled it on cross-examination.  
Significantly, the family court failed to consider evidence presented regarding the 
various funds Husband received from his business entities, which he in turn used 
for personal expenses or to satisfy other obligations.   
In Grumbos v. Grumbos, 393 S.C. 33, 43, 710 S.E.2d 76, 81 (Ct. App. 2011), the 
family court imputed additional income to Husband for purposes of calculating 
alimony, recognizing that "it was difficult to determine Husband's earning 
potential. Husband's testimony lacks credibility."  In affirming, this court 
explained that "[w]ithout a meaningful representation of Husband's current income, 
14 Husband filed only two financial declarations, one in June of 2009 and one in 
January of 2010, each reflecting his income to be $8,333 per month.  These 
financial declarations include only the income Husband received from Crew 
Carolina. They in no way accurately reflect the disbursements paid directly to 
certain creditors on Husband's behalf or to Husband to cover certain personal 
expenses. 
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the family court was required to resort to other credible evidence, namely the 
parties' expenses, in assessing income."  393 S.C. at 43, 710 S.E.2d at 82. 
Here, Husband's business records reflected distributions of the following:  (1) 
approximately $76,000 from Crew, identified only as "Cash Disbursements"; (2) 
another $266,000 from Crew, identified only as "Miscellaneous Expenses"; and (3) 
over $258,000 from BHBI, identified only as "Miscellaneous Expenses." 
Husband's testimony that none of these expenses or disbursements were for his 
personal use is contradicted when examined in conjunction with his financial 
records. Specifically, the following were paid to or on Husband's behalf by Crew 
and BHBI: (1) approximately $14,000 for Husband's trips to France, New York, 
and Chicago; (2) approximately $4,400 in payments to Child's private school; (3) 
$42,000 in one year paid for his life insurance premiums; (4) thousands of dollars 
in payments on condo and farm mortgages; and (5) thousands of dollars paid to 
employees doing personal labor. 
Husband claimed on multiple occasions throughout the trial that he was "broke" 
and survived on just $250 per week; however, as explained herein, the evidence 
shows Husband actually lived a comfortable lifestyle, despite his claims that he 
was likely being forced into bankruptcy.  Based on the foregoing, we reverse and 
remand the income determination because the family court's imputation of only 
$100,000 in income per year to Husband was erroneous.   
IV. Alimony 
Wife argues the family court erred in failing to award her alimony, pointing to
several factors she believes weigh heavily in favor of a substantial award of 
permanent alimony.  Because we hold the family court improperly calculated 
Husband's imputed income, we reverse the denial of alimony and remand for the 
family court to conduct an appropriate alimony analysis.   
"In domestic actions, this court reviews alimony awards and the family court's 
equitable apportionment of marital property for an abuse of discretion."  Reiss v. 
Reiss, 392 S.C. 198, 207, 708 S.E.2d 799, 803–04 (Ct. App. 2011); see also
Dearybury v. Dearybury, 351 S.C. 278, 282, 569 S.E.2d 367, 369 (2002) (finding 
the decision to grant or deny alimony rests within the sound discretion of the 
family court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion).  "An abuse of 
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discretion occurs when the judge is controlled by some error of law or where the 
order, based upon findings of fact, is without evidentiary support."  Dearybury, 
351 S.C. at 282, 569 S.E.2d at 369.
"Alimony is a substitute for the support normally incident to the marital 
relationship and should put the supported spouse in the same position, or as near as 
is practicable to the same position, enjoyed during the marriage."  Reiss, 392 S.C. 
at 208, 708 S.E.2d at 804. "If an award of alimony is warranted, the family court 
has a duty to make an award that is fit, equitable, and just." Id. South Carolina 
law provides that "[t]he family court may grant alimony in such amounts and for 
such term as the judge considers appropriate under the circumstances.  Id. 
In determining an award of alimony, the family court must consider the following 
factors: 
(1) duration of the marriage; (2) the physical and 
emotional health of the parties; (3) educational 
background of the parties; (4) employment history and 
earning potential of the parties; (5) standard of living 
during the marriage; (6) current and reasonably 
anticipated earnings of the parties; (7) current and 
reasonably anticipated expenses of the parties; (8) 
marital and nonmarital property of the parties; (9) 
custody of the children; (10) marital misconduct or fault; 
(11) tax consequences; (12) prior support obligations; 
and (13) any other factors the family court considers 
relevant. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (2014).  "However, '[t]he family court is only 
required to consider relevant factors.'" Reiss, 392 S.C. at 209, 708 S.E.2d at 805 
(alteration in original) (quoting King v. King, 384 S.C. 134, 142, 681 S.E.2d 609, 
613 (Ct. App. 2009)).  Further, "[a]limony is not intended to be a reward to one nor 
a punishment to the other. It is basically for the purpose of maintaining the status 
quo as near as possible [as] established by the parties."  Kane v. Kane, 280 S.C. 
479, 484, 313 S.E.2d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 1984).   
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Because the family court erred in calculating Husband's income and the marital 
debt—and reached no calculation as to the value of the marital estate, discussed 
infra—we reverse the denial of alimony to Wife and remand for the family court to 
consider Wife's entitlement to alimony in conjunction with an appropriate
equitable apportionment analysis.  
` 
V. Child Support Determination
Wife argues the family court erred in its determination of child support by (1) not 
properly calculating Husband's income when it set the child support and (2) not 
considering the needs of Child.  Because we hold Husband's income was 
improperly calculated, the child support award must be reversed as well. 
"The question of child support is largely within the discretion of the trial judge 
whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is 
shown." Hopkins v. Hopkins, 343 S.C. 301, 305, 540 S.E.2d 454, 456 (2000).  "An 
abuse of discretion occurs when the court is controlled by some error of law or 
where the order, based upon the findings of fact, is without evidentiary support."  
Kelley v. Kelley, 324 S.C. 481, 485, 477 S.E.2d 727, 729 (Ct. App. 1996).  An 
appellate court will reverse a manifest abuse of discretion where the error of law is 
"so opposed to the trial judge's sound discretion as to amount to a deprivation of 
the legal rights of the party."  Jeter, 369 S.C. at 438, 633 S.E.2d at 145.  The term 
"abuse of discretion" does not reflect negatively on the trial court; rather, it merely 
indicates the appellate court believes an error of law occurred in the circumstances
at hand. See Macauley v. Query, 193 S.C. 1, 5, 7 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1940). 
In the Final Order, the family court ordered Husband to pay child support directly 
to Wife pursuant to the South Carolina Child Support Guidelines in the amount of 
$821 per month.  The family court based this number upon an imputed income to 
Wife of $45,000 annually and to Husband of $100,000 annually.  Additionally, the 
family court ordered Husband to provide health insurance for Child; however, 
Wife was ordered to pay the first $250 of uncovered medical, dental, and
prescription expenses incurred per calendar year. 
In support of her argument that the family court should have departed from the 
Child Support Guidelines and required Husband to provide additional benefits, 
Wife cites to Rabon v. Rabon, 288 S.C. 338, 342 S.E.2d 605 (1986).  The court in 
Rabon held the trial court erred when it failed to consider the cost of private 
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schooling for the children when they could benefit from enrollment and father was
able to afford to contribute.  Id. at 340, 342 S.E.2d 606–07.  In this case, Wife 
points out that Child grew up with the benefit of the following:  (1) private 
schooling at Ashley Hall School, (2) attending summer camps, (3) a nice home, (4) 
vacation homes, (5) music lessons, (6) extensive travel, and (7) horseback 
riding/showing. 
However, unlike the father in Rabon, it is not clear whether Husband can afford to 
pay for Child's private school education.  While we agree with the family court that 
"both parties' standard of living must be substantially decreased as they have in the 
past lived off monies borrowed from various people or companies," we find this 
issue should also be remanded to the family court because Husband's income was 
not properly determined.  
VI. Life Insurance to Secure Award of Alimony 
Wife argues the family court erred in failing to require Husband to maintain life 
insurance or other security for alimony and child support.  We remand this question 
for the court's consideration in conjunction with its alimony analysis and the 
recalculation of child support. 
"The family court may order the payor spouse to obtain life insurance as security 
for an alimony or child support obligation if the supported spouse can demonstrate 
the existence of special circumstances with reference to her need for security and 
the payor spouse's ability to provide it."  Smith v. Smith, 386 S.C. 251, 264, 687 
S.E.2d 720, 727 (Ct. App. 2009).  "In considering whether the supported spouse 
has demonstrated a need for such security, the family court shall consider 'the 
supported spouse's age, health, income, earning ability, and accumulated assets.'"  
Id. (quoting Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 553, 615 S.E.2d 98, 109 (2005)).  "If 
a need for security is found, the family court should then consider 'the payor 
spouse's ability to secure the award with life insurance by considering the payor 
spouse's age, health, income earning ability, accumulated assets, insurability, cost 
of premiums, and insurance plan carried by the parties during the marriage.'" Id.
(quoting Wooten, 364 S.C. at 553, 615 S.E.2d at 109). 
Wife argues "the circumstances justify requiring Husband to secure his alimony 
and child support payments with the same life insurance he had for the benefit of 
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Wife and daughter during the marriage."  As to these circumstances, Wife pointed 
out that Husband, who was fifty-nine at the time of trial, is fifteen years older than 
Wife.  Additionally, Child was twelve years old at the time of trial.   
Our review of the record and the family court's orders does not demonstrate that 
the family court properly considered the need for the security or Husband's 
"income, earning ability, and accumulated assets" with respect to any of its
findings. Thus, we reverse and remand the question of requiring Husband to 
maintain life insurance or other support security.  
VII. Equitable Division of Marital Assets and Debts 
Wife argues the family court erred in identifying, valuing, and apportioning various 
marital assets and debts. Specifically, Wife asserts the family court erred in the 
following:  (1) its determination and apportionment of the marital interests in 
BHBI; (2) finding no "special equity" or transmutation in Kensington Plantation 
and the King Street properties; (3) its determination and apportionment of the 
"debts" owed to Brother; (4) ordering that Wife be responsible for certain debts 
owed to Brother; (5) failing to credit the marital estate with 50% of the $175,000 
upfit monies; (6) reducing the value of 101 Palm Boulevard by $424,203; (7) 
failing to apportion valuable marital artwork between the parties; and (8) failing to 
include Wife's debts in the equitable division.   
Although an appellate court has the authority to make findings of fact in 
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, it nonetheless 
"should approach an equitable division award with a presumption that the family 
court acted within its broad discretion.  The family court's award should be 
reversed only when the appellant demonstrates an abuse of discretion."  Lewis, 392 
S.C. at 384–85, 709 S.E.2d at 651 (quoting Dawkins v. Dawkins, 386 S.C. 169, 
172–73, 687 S.E.2d 52, 54 (2010)).
The equitable apportionment statute, section 20-3-620(B) of the South Carolina 
Code (2014), enumerates the factors that must be considered by the family court in 
determining the appropriate division of marital assets.  See Smith v. Smith, 327 S.C. 
448, 460, 486 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the predecessor statute 
to section 20-3-620).
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These [factors] include, inter alia, the duration of the 
marriage, marital misconduct by either spouse, the health 
of each spouse, the income of each spouse, and the 
contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the 
marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as 
homemaker.  
Id.
As set forth above, the family court's conduct of the trial with regard to Brother's 
interest in the marital estate and Husband's debts owed to Brother was problematic 
and erroneous, leading to its finding that "[t]here is no equity in the marital assets."  
The root of this error, exacerbated by the conduct of the two-week trial itself, was 
the failure of the family court to "ensure that the debts were incurred for the joint 
benefit of the parties during the marriage."  See Allen v. Allen, 287 S.C. 501, 507, 
339 S.E.2d 872, 876 (Ct. App. 1986) (reversing portions of equitable distribution 
award which charged marital estate with loans from husband's sister and denied 
wife any interest in office building erroneously determined to have no equity to 
divide). In Allen, our court emphasized that "loans from close family members 
must be closely scrutinized for legitimacy."  Id. No such scrutiny was applied in 
this matter.
We find the family court abused its discretion in ignoring the extent to which 
Kensington Plantation and the King Street properties have been interwoven with 
the debts owed Brother and the ongoing financing of the marital (and Husband's 
newer) business ventures.  This, in addition to the errors noted above with regard to 
the family court's lack of concern with the unauthorized sale of ten percent of 
BHBI (and the undisclosed documents detailing such), the income from BHBI that 
the court failed to attribute to Husband, the failure of the court to consider 
Brother's undisclosed interest in BHEC, and the use of BHBI funds for such new 
ventures as Amen Street, J & S Fish, LLC, and Rice Market requires reversal of the 
entire equitable apportionment analysis as to both marital assets and marital debt.  
VIII. Wife's Special Equity in New Businesses
Wife argues Husband has used marital funds from the couple's various businesses 
to fund the construction and operation of Amen Street Fish and Raw Bar, J & S 
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Fish, LLC, and the Rice Market restaurant despite the fact that Husband claims
BHBI—his only income-producing asset—struggles to make payroll.  For the 
aforementioned reasons, we reverse the family court's denial of a special equity to 
Wife.  On remand, in consideration of this question, the family court must 
determine if the new businesses have been supported with funds either (1) earned 
by BHBI prior to the date of filing or (2) in which Wife and Child hold a 
percentage interest. 
IX. Contempt
Wife argues the family court erred in failing to find Husband in contempt for 
failing to pay his portion of the fee for the court-appointed CPA as well as the fees 
Husband was ordered to pay Wife's attorney upon consideration of the sixth rule to 
show cause.  We agree. 
An appellate court "should reverse a decision regarding contempt 'only if it is 
without evidentiary support or the trial judge has abused his discretion.'" Durlach 
v. Durlach, 359 S.C. 64, 70, 596 S.E.2d 908, 912 (2004) (quoting Stone v. Reddix-
Smalls, 295 S.C. 514, 516, 369 S.E.2d 840 (1988)); see also Henderson v. 
Henderson, 298 S.C. 190, 197, 379 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1989) ("A finding of 
contempt rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.").  "An abuse of 
discretion occurs either when the court is controlled by some error of law or where 
the order, based upon findings of fact, lacks evidentiary support."  Miller v. Miller, 
375 S.C. 443, 452, 652 S.E.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Townsend v. 
Townsend, 356 S.C. 70, 73, 587 S.E.2d 118, 119 (Ct. App. 2003)).
"Contempt results from the willful disobedience of an order of the court." Bigham 
v. Bigham, 264 S.C. 101, 104, 212 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1975); Smith v. Smith, 359 
S.C. 393, 396, 597 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2004); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-620 
(Supp. 2015) ("An adult who wilfully violates, neglects, or refuses to obey or 
perform a lawful order of the court, or who violates any provision of this chapter, 
may be proceeded against for contempt of court.").  "A willful act is one which is 
'done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something the law 
forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be 
done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.'"  
Widman v. Widman, 348 S.C. 97, 119, 557 S.E.2d 693, 705 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(quoting Spartanburg Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 82–83, 370 
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S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988)). "Where a contemnor is unable, without fault on his part, 
to obey an order of the court, he is not to be held in contempt." Smith-Cooper v. 
Cooper, 344 S.C. 289, 301, 543 S.E.2d 271, 277 (Ct. App. 2001).
Husband's contempt sentence from the sixth rule to show cause was suspended on 
the condition that he make the court-ordered payments to the court-appointed CPA
and Wife's attorney.  Because Husband failed to make the two payments, we hold 
the family court erred in failing to hold Husband in contempt or in any way address 
his nonpayment. 
X. Grounds for Divorce 
Wife next argues the family court erred in failing to grant her a divorce on the 
ground of adultery because the court's findings are not supported by the 
preponderance of the evidence.  We reverse and remand. 
In Brown v. Brown, 379 S.C. 271, 277–78, 665 S.E.2d 174, 178 (Ct. App. 2008), 
this court held proof of adultery must be made by a clear preponderance of the 
evidence and it may be proven by circumstantial evidence that shows a disposition 
to commit the offense as well as the opportunity to do so.  "Generally, 'proof must 
be sufficiently definite to identify the time and place of the offense and the 
circumstances under which it was committed.'" Id. at 278, 665 S.E.2d at 178 
(quoting Loftis v. Loftis, 284 S.C. 216, 218, 325 S.E.2d 73, 74 (Ct. App. 1985)).  
"Evidence placing a spouse and a third party together on several occasions, without 
more, does not warrant the conclusion the spouse committed adultery."  Id.; see 
also Mick-Skaggs v. Skaggs, 411 S.C. 94, 102, 766 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 
2014) (holding family court acted within its discretion in awarding parties a no-
fault divorce based on one year's continuous separation, even though wife 
presented sufficient evidence to establish husband's adultery; evidence was 
presented that each spouse engaged in extramarital conduct during the marriage, 
and family court was in best position to assess the parties' and witnesses' testimony 
as well as the evidence presented in determining which ground for divorce was 
most appropriate under the circumstances). 
Wife argues she clearly established Husband committed adultery with one 
employee paramour around the time the parties separated—the catalyst for the 
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separation—and with a second employee paramour shortly after the separation of 
the parties but prior to the date of filing—the catalyst for the divorce action.   
We are concerned with the family court's handling of this trial, including its  
request for and acceptance of Brother's proposed order on the question of fault 
because Brother was purportedly permitted to intervene solely to protect his 
interests in the alleged marital debts and properties he owned with Husband.  Thus, 
we reverse and remand for proper consideration of Wife's evidence on the question 
of marital fault. 
XI. Attorney's Fees
Lastly, Wife argues the family court erred in not awarding her attorney's fees and 
costs. We agree. 
Section 20-3-130(H) of the South Carolina Code (2014) authorizes the family court 
to order payment of litigation expenses to either party in a divorce action.  "An 
award of attorney's fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and 
should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."  Garris v.
McDuffie, 288 S.C. 637, 644, 344 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 1986).  However, if 
the substantive results obtained by counsel are reversed on appeal, the attorney's 
fee award must also be reversed.  Sexton v. Sexton, 310 S.C. 501, 503–04, 427 
S.E.2d 665, 666 (1993); see also, E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 477, 415 S.E.2d 
812, 816 (1992) (reversing the award of attorney's fees where the substantive 
results achieved by counsel were reversed on appeal). 
"A family court should first consider the following factors as set forth in E.D.M. v.
T.A.M., in deciding whether to award attorney's fees and costs:  (1) each party's 
ability to pay his or her own fee; (2) the beneficial results obtained by the attorney; 
(3) the parties' respective financial conditions; and (4) the effect of the fee on each 
party's standard of living."  Farmer v. Farmer, 388 S.C. 50, 57, 694 S.E.2d 47, 51 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citing E.D.M., 307 S.C. at 476–77, 415 S.E.2d at 816).  "A party's 
ability to pay is an essential factor in determining whether an attorney's fee should 
be awarded, as are the parties' respective financial conditions and the effect of the 
award on each party's standard of living."  Rogers v. Rogers, 343 S.C. 329, 334, 
540 S.E.2d 840, 842 (2001) (citing Sexton, 310 S.C. at 503, 427 S.E.2d at 666). 
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Here, the Final Order generally acknowledges the E.D.M. factors in deciding 
whether to award attorney's fees, but this finding is significantly impacted by the 
family court's erroneous rulings on Husband's income, alimony, and child support.
A proper calculation of Husband's true income would establish his greater ability to 
pay fees. In addition, Husband's behavior in eliciting six rules to show cause, as 
well as his conduct throughout the trial, significantly increased the costs of this 
litigation. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions for a proper analysis and 
award of Wife's attorney's fees and costs, including the ongoing suit costs she will 
likely incur on remand.
As to expert costs, the family court found both parties should equally bear the costs 
of the court-appointed CPA, Tracy Amos.  We agree with Wife's argument that 
there is nothing in the Final Order regarding the reallocation of fees previously 
ordered to be paid to Amos.  Therefore, we conclude this matter should also be 
remanded to the family court for a determination of the proper allocation of 
litigation expenses, including the impact of the rulings to be made on any open 
contempt issues. 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the family court's orders of September 6, 2011, and 
October 15, 2011, are reversed and this matter is remanded for a new trial.  
Accordingly, the decision of the family court is 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
WILLIAMS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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